Abstract: There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for "display" advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a $25 billion business annually. The present study derives a method of pricing such advertisements based on their relative scarcity while insuring that all campaigns obtain a reasonably representative sample of the relevant opportunities. The mechanism is well-behaved under supply uncertainty. A method based on mechanism described in this paper is in use at Yahoo! Inc.
1
There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for "display" advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a $25 billion business annually. The present study derives a method of pricing such advertisements based on their relative scarcity while insuring that all campaigns obtain a reasonably representative sample of the relevant opportunities. The mechanism is well-behaved under supply uncertainty. A method based on mechanism described in this paper is in use at Yahoo! Inc.
When an advertiser purchases a guaranteed contract, often there will be many kinds of content or inventory, the pages on which the ads may run, that can be used to satisfy the contract.
For example, a buyer of ten million impressions on autos.com may get high-income males in Los Angeles or blind senior citizens in Fargo, ND. Automobile advertisers are going to be unhappy if they mostly get the latter. On the other hand, guaranteeing the specific quantities of each type of customer provides little leeway in the event that demand or supply change, and supply varies substantially over time. Thus, guaranteed advertising contracts should simultaneously respect advertisers' wishes to avoid poor quality opportunities, while providing the agency or network with adequate flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances.
A strategy for insuring overall quality would be to provide representation across supply types. Thus, a guaranteed display advertiser might be provided with a mix of locations, with flexibility in the mix given to the network subject to some kind of budget. This solution sounds good in principle but encounters practical problems almost instantly. Advertisers increasingly specify target audience attributes. These attributes include standard demographic variables like age, gender, income, and geography. However, many other targeting attributes are used, for example "interested in autos" as judged by visits to auto-related web pages. Advertisers have created advertising campaigns to show their advertisements only in cities where the sun is shining, and only when the Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen that day.
Detailed targeting creates "orphan categories," in which no one is interested. For example, if one advertiser buys ads based on "the sun is shining" and another based on "the stock market is up," four categories of inventory, each with distinct demand, are created (e.g. stock market down and sun shining). There are trillions of such categories just based on demographics, geographic selection and interest-based "behavioral" targeting created by a hundred campaigns, and large advertising networks handle hundreds of campaigns. Ostensibly all of these trillions of categories must be priced to carry out a delivery mix based on pricing. Unfortunately, it is not practical to actually compute the prices of trillions of categories, nor is it sensible to price categories in which no one is directly interested. Our mechanism is the only existing methodology for pricing campaigns -sets of advertisements like "males in California" or "people who live in cities in which the sun is shining" -while avoiding the need to price orphan categories and simultaneously insuring that advertisers obtain as representative an allocation of inventory as is technically feasible. This paper starts by deriving "maximally representative allocations." This produces a parameterized family of demands. These demands aggregate simply and naturally and lead to market prices by equating supply and demand. Moreover the pricing system based on supply and demand is very well-behaved indeed. In fact, it is sufficiently well-behaved that it accommodates supply uncertainty effectively.
Equilibrium Pricing and Targets
Consider an agency, publisher or network that has a set of supply pools of inventory.
Examples of supply pools could include "young men on auto pages" or "unknown gender on a computer related news article." The objective we posit is to minimize the weighted squared distance of the within-supply pool market shares from representative market shares. By representative shares, we mean the 3 The role of ri is as a floor or reserve price. It is the minimum that should ever be accepted, and can be thought of as the price that obtains by auctioning the impression in an exchange or the value of running a "house ad" (an ad for the website's own content) or a public service advertisement.
values of the background population. For campaign j, the representative share of inventory type
; this is the proportion of the total feasible inventory represented by the i th type.
The squared distance is chosen primarily for tractability and we will also investigate the KL divergence (maximum entropy) as an alternate objective in a subsequent section. The squared distance has useful properties in that the statistics of mean squared error are well understood. Moreover, finding solutions to minimizing quadratics are possible using fast algorithms. It is desirable to weight the squared deviations by 
There are three kinds of constraints. The allocation must be feasible, meaning there is adequate inventory in each supply pool. Mathematically this requires
, for every supply pool i.
Second, each campaign must meet its guarantee, requiring
In addition, quantities are non-negative, creating a constraint
, for all i and j.
Let p i be the Lagrangian multiplier (shadow value) on the inventory constraint (2) and α j be the multiplier on the campaign guarantee constraint (3). We will handle the non-negativity constraint manually. The Lagrangian becomes:
We refer to the solution that minimizes (1) subject to (2)-(4) as the L 2 maximally representative allocation.
Theorem 1: There are campaign shadow values p* j and inventory prices p i such that the maximally representative allocation is given by:
Theorem 1 shows that the demand system under maximally representative allocations are linear. Moreover, given the values p* j , there is a closed form for the inventory-specific prices.
In particular, summing (5) over j,
, then p i = r i , and otherwise p i is determined by Finding the solution to the maximal representative allocation problem is thus a much lower dimensional problem and in fact is solvable in practice. In a subsequent paper, Ghosh et al (2009) show that the maximally representative allocations can be implemented using randomized bidding in an exchange environment. The basis for that solution is provided by manipulating equation (5), which can be rewritten to look like a conditional bid. First note that the probability of obtaining inventory is 
x y is written as the product of two numbers, one of which is independent of i, and the other which depends on pi.
Both of these numbers are less than or equal to one and hence can be interpreted to be probabilities. Ghosh, et al (2009) is to show how to rationalize a set of such campaigns that might conflict with each other; in particular it could be necessary to divert inventory that one campaign loses to another campaign. This in particular arises whenever
By submitting a bid which is uniform on
and Hurwicz, 1959 for the proof. Thus the system has a unique solution and is well-behaved and readily computable.
A 2× × × ×2 Example
Consider two supply pools, 1 and 2. There are 3M units of each supply pool. Either supply pool sells for $1 per unit in the wholesale market (r i ). There are two buyers. Buyer 1 wants 2M from supply pool 1. Buyer 2 wants 3M units spread across both. Set
It is possible to serve the entire demand at the reserve price, with buyer 1 getting 2M from supply pool 1, and buyer 2 getting 1M from supply pool 1 and 2M from supply pool 2.
By a routine calculation, the price of supply pool 1 is $1.67. The price is used to shift the second buyer away from supply pool 1, so as to accommodate the focused demand of buyer 1.
Thus, the ability of buyer 1 to purchase an entire pool is limited by the buyer paying for the distortion in allocation to buyer 2, and such price changes are significant.
KL Divergence
The Kullback-Leibler divergence is a measure of deviation from an ideal distribution, and is closely related to maximum entropy (Csiszar 1991) . Mathematically, the KL divergence is
This objective function faces the same constraints (2)-(4). There is an important property of the KL minimization:
This property arises because
, so that it is always desirable to allocate a small bit of feasible inventory to each contract. Thus KL minimization is always an interior solution, in contrast to the L 2 case where zeros will arise whenever a contract value p* j is lower than the effective price of the inventory j i i s p . As a result, the Lagrangian method produces a nearly closed form solution for the KL minimization problem. Let Here p i is the price of inventory of type i, and α j is the shadow value of campaign j.
These must sum to the overall campaign objective, which determines α j , so
The KL objective function is convex. While it is generally not strictly convex, it has a unique optimal allocation that is readily found through gradient descent. Consequently, both the KL divergence solution and the L 2 objective are readily solved in practice, the latter using quadratic programming.
Supply Uncertainty
With supply uncertainty, the means by which the allocations are chosen become relevant.
We consider the situation where selection is fractional, that is, the publisher dictates that a fraction of the inventory will be applied to various advertisers, and then the supply is realized and the fractions executed. There are several reasons for focusing on fractions. First, rotational schemes are not uncommon in practice. A rotational scheme comes in the form "first impression to A, second impression to B, …" and implements a fractional allocation. Second, advertisers recognize a product sometimes known as "share of voice," which contractually guarantees a certain fraction of the impressions. Third, fractional allocation skirts the priority problem, where otherwise an publisher must determine which of the various advertisers get which parts of the available inventory. Thus, fractional allocations have both mathematical simplicity and real world relevance.
Let f i j be the fraction of inventory i assigned to campaign j; in the previous notation, In practice, publishers may experience an asymmetric loss from failure to meet the campaign quantity. This can be modeled by imposing the cost of not meeting the campaign quantity objective only when the allocation is too low. A penalty for over-delivery already exists through the price of the inventory. This penalty consideration induces a rewrite of the Lagrangian as:
In this case, the solution comes in the form:
where γ j is the probability of not meeting the campaign objective times the penalty α j .
Conclusion
This paper develops a methodology for pricing supply pools of advertising opportunities and allocating available inventory to campaigns. It has the distinct advantages of straightforward computation and a pricing rule which reflects both scarcity and the desire for a representative allocation. Representativeness is a useful property for much the same reason that mutual funds are good investment vehicles; they reduce risk and mitigate the problem of being assigned the worst possible inventory consistent with the contract. This mitigation has the important advantage of encouraging advertisers to provide flexibility to the network in choosing the locations of their advertisements. Such flexibility is critical to actually being able to implement a set of advertising campaigns.
A second advantage to the system is that the problem of pricing inventory and the problem of allocation inventory to campaigns are considered as a single optimization problem.
While this integration is not special to maximally representative allocations, and indeed could be operated in any pricing system, it is nevertheless extremely valuable. Integrating the allocations of inventory with the pricing of inventory permits the pricing of campaigns to be consistent with the pricing of inventory, in other words, the price charged to an advertiser can be a markup of the price of the inventory allocated. Rather than use a "price first, allocate second" methodology common in the industry, maximum representative allocations insure that the pricing of campaigns reflects not only the expected cost of the inventory but also a cost for the distortion of inventory provided to other campaigns, by integrating the pricing and the serving plan.
A third advantage is that the implementation can be achieved by using a randomized bidding mechanism. This means that the allocation can be achieved without ex ante knowledge of the price of a particular piece of inventory, because the same bidding distribution works for all eligible inventory. Moreover, the distribution takes a particularly simple form, uniform for L 2 and exponential for KL.
Yahoo! has already implemented a version of this system in its display advertising serving system, based on the analysis of this and subsequent papers.
